Abstract-In this paper, we proposes a new mathematical model for evaluating a given anonymized dataset that needs to be reidentified. Many anonymization algorithms have been proposed in the area called privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), but, no anonymization algorithms are suitable for all scenarios because many factors are involved. In order to address the issues of anonymization, we propose a new mathematical model based on the Zipf distribution. Our model is simple, but it fits well with the real distribution of trajectory data. We demonstrate the primary property of our model and we extend it to a more complex environment. Using our model, we define the theoretical bound for reidentification, which yields the appropriate optimal level for anonymization.
I. INTRODUCTION
At present, the volume of digital data is growing exponentially every year. Many business organizations try to collect our personal data so that they can share this data with partners and use data-mining algorithms to extract useful knowledge related to the behavior of customers and their preference for goods. However, many people are concerned about the leakage of personal data without their consent and violations of their privacy due to the publication of personal data.
Many anonymization algorithms have been proposed to preserve privacy in the area called PPDP. PPDP aims to retain the utility of data that have been anonymized, i.e., by making data less specific so that a particular individual cannot be identified. Anonymization algorithms employ various operations, including the suppression of attributes or records, generalization of values, replacing values with pseudonyms, perturbation with random noise, sampling, rounding, swapping, top/bottom coding, and microaggregation [1] , [2] .
It is not simple to anonymize data fully without the risk of reidentification. In particular, anonymization is affected by the following concerns.
1) Motivated intruder. It is difficult to predict the actions of an adversary. In [1] , a motivated intruder is defined as an entity who may take a record from an anonymized datasets and search for a match in publicly available information. In addition, it
is not clear what information might be available to a motivated intruder. 2) Lack of common metrics for quantifying privacy and utility.
It is well known that a publisher should be responsible for the risk of de-identification from their data. For example, as stated in [3] , "First, the company must take reasonable measures to ensure that the data is de-identified." However, the risk is uncertain. The requirements and the utility vary according to the hypothesis employed by different algorithms. Thus, a multistakeholder process may help to obtain a consensus regarding measurement, but this requires a long time.
Although several measures of risk re-identification have been extensively used, e.g., Skinner and Elliot [4] , Benitez et al. [5] , there is no common measure that has been agreed for all. 3) Lack of real datasets.
It is difficult to select the most appropriate algorithm given the data and an application because the results will vary with different datasets and parameters. Moreover, the original dataset is often not available in practice. Thus, instead of the original data, experimental open data are used to measure risk. For example, AyalaRivera et al. used the Adult census dataset from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [6] and the synthetically generated Irish dataset in [7] . Although the sdcMicro package [8] has been used by several researcher, it refers to a standard database and not to a location privacy.
Our Approach. Mathematical Model of Anonymized Data:
In order to address the issues of anonymization, we propose a new mathematical model based on the Zipf distribution. Our model is simple but it fits well with the real distribution of trajectory data. We demonstrate the primary property of our model and we extend it to a more complex environment. Using our model, we define the theoretical bound for reidentification, which yields the appropriate optimal level of anonymization.
Our Contributions.: Our first contribution is a proposal of a general mathematical model of data. Our model is based on the power law probability distribution, known as Zipf's law. Using the least-squared method, we can efficiently fit arbitrary quantities to our model with required accuracy. Especially, it fits well to general trajectory data, which is one of our targets to examine. Moreover, our model allows us to approximate a combination of multiple models because of it simplicity.
Our second contribution is that we clarified the fundamental properties of our model. Based on the these properties, we prove the lower bound of the threshold for identifying an individual from anonymized records. The threshold plays an important role in anonymization because it determines the fraction of records we need to suppress to satisfy k-anonymity. It is known that there is a tradeoff between the privacy degree and the utility of the data. Hence, we want to minimize the number of records being altered. Our model allows to clarify the least number of records being linked so that the preferable degree of anonymity is preserved without performing any experiment.
Our third contribution is to demonstrate our proposed model based on the statistics provided from the Japan Railway Co. and clarified the risk of the anonymized data to be linked uniquely. We examine the least and the mean ranks in the set of stations that are unable to be identified uniquely. Our analysis reveals that most of the records can be identified with very low degree of anonymity.
The problem that a few trips can identify a user is closely related to the problem of privacy in search log. Given multiple queries in search log, we could identify individual with statistic property of the database in the similar way. Similar problem may occur in many applications, e.g., the history of purchase in online shops, the list of books in a library, and so on. Hence, our model can be extended to more general framework.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define three threads in anonymized data, reidentification, distinguished, and identified, as the example of trajectory data. In Section III, we propose a mathematical model of anonymized dataset and study some fundamental properties. We also discuss the utility of anonymity as called anonymity ratio. In Section IV-A, we examined the risk in the Japan Railway trajectory data. Finally, we conclude our study in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARY A. Anonymization and Risk of Identification
Many models have been proposed to formally guarantee the privacy of big data, such as k-anonymity [9] , [10] , -diversity [11] , t-closeness [12] , and differential privacy [13] .
To illustrate anonymization operations, let us consider the trajectory data example shown in Fig. 1 , which is assumed be owned by a railway company, where the attributes comprise the names of passengers, the day of use, the stations at which passengers board and alight, and the balance on prepaid RFID cards after being charged. The simplest way to anonymize data is suppression, which drops attributes such as the name, day, and balance because they can be exploited to identify particular individuals. If record contains a significant distinguishing value, e.g., a rare station labeled "Nakano", then the whole record can be suppressed. by replacing names with random numbers called pseudonym, Occasionally, the pseudonyms may be assigned again on a monthly or weekly basis. The anonymized data may appear to be secure against an attacker who might try to identify individuals from the data. However, it is well known that the set of various attributes called quasi-identifier (QIDs) can be exploited to link the records in a table. Figure 2 illustrates the threads present in anonymized data, where the sequence of stations is stored as pseudonym. In this case, some threads are classified as follows:
(1) reidentification; particular individual names can be obtained from anonymized data for various reasons, such as matching with an auxiliary dataset to help to identify a passenger. (2) distinguished; some records are linked by QIDs. For example, pseudonym 3 distinguishes the first and the third records from others, thereby allowing all of the stations to be traced back to the pseudonym assigned to a specific individual. It should be noted that the records linked with pseudonyms 3 and 4 have exactly the same values (stations), and thus the distinguished does not always mean uniquely determined. (3) uniquely identified; only one record is associated with the value and the individual can be identified uniquely.
In the example, the record with pseudonym 6 can be uniquely identified based on the value "Nakano," which is associated with only one passenger. The stations "Tokyo" and "Shinjuku", are associated with at least two passengers so they cannot be identified uniquely.
Even if multiple records are linked by a pseudonym, some candidates will share the same values, such as the individuals assigned pseudonyms 3 and 4. Thus, we can say that they are not yet uniquely identified at that time. However, if their pseudonyms do not change over time, more stations will be linked with them and they can be uniquely identified. The likelihood of being uniquely identified increases with the duration of pseudonyms.
Even if individual with pseudonyms either 3 or 4 is not uniquely identified, due to -diversity [11] there is a risk of inference attribute values, i.e., an attacker, who knows the target went from Shinjuku to Tokyo, can infer that he went also from Tokyo to Yokohama. It is true that we should notice this threat, we leave the problem as one of future study.
Algorithms such as k-anonymity ensure that every combination of published attributes and records is indistinguishable for no less than k instances. For example, by suppressing the unique records of pseudonym 6, the data satisfy 2-anonymity because two linked records have the QID, "Shinjuku"-"Tokyo"-"Yokohama."
Thus, we must address the following questions.
• How long can existing pseudonyms be used to maintain k-anonymity? • How many records do we need to suppress to satisfy anonymity? • How can we evaluate the degree of anonymity for an arbitrary dataset using different statistics?
III. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF AN ANONYMIZED DATASET

A. Fundamental Definition
We begin by defining a personal dataset characterized by parameters n and m. A record belongs to a single user who performed an action at time t. A user may have multiple records in a dataset, so m ≥ n holds in general. Attributes are classified into two classes: static attributes, such as name, sex, marital status, and postal code; and dynamic attributes, such as location, money balance, blood pressure, heart rate, and name of disease. A set of previous attributes is known as QID if it links the records generated by a single user. Various properties have been studied to reduce the risk of reidentification based on an anonymized dataset, e.g., k-anonymity [9] , [10] anddiversity [11] . Dynamic attributes are often referred as sensitive attributes (SAs) because they comprise critical information that the user may wish to hide. However, even if we suppress the QIDs from the dataset, the following theorem shows that collecting a very small number of records (SAs) can allow an individual to be identified.
Theorem 3.1: Given a dataset of n individuals where a SA is uniformly distributed with probability, 1/d, all individuals can be uniquely identified from s = log d n records.
Proof: The number of s-combinations of d-set is d
s , which equals n when all of the individuals are uniquely identified. Hence, we obtain the theorem by taking logarithms for both sides.
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For example, the population of Tokyo and its surroundings area in Japan comprises n = 42, 598, 300 individuals (Kanto area in 2012 1 ) and there are d = 2, 497 stations 2 , and thus we find that s = 2.25 records are sufficient to uniquely identify all of the individuals in the Tokyo area. It should be noted that each individual has the same risk of being uniquely identified based on more than two records of associated with stations because we assume that there is a uniform distribution of station choices, and thus all cases with two records can be distinguished.
This number is surprisingly small. If we want to publish a trajectory dataset generated from smartcards logs as open data, the theorem implies that pseudonym IDs must be reassigned every three hops when traversing among stations. However, excessively frequent assignments of pseudonym IDs could degrade the correlations among the trajectories and the utility of the data would be lost.
Is the assumption of a uniform distribution of stations too strong?
The answer is no. In the following section, we show that the reidentification risk remains high even if the assumption of a uniform distribution is relaxed.
B. Mathematical Model of a Single-Station Record
To model the trajectory data, we use the following power law probability distribution, which is known as Zipf's law. Definition 3.2: (Zipf's Model) Let f (x) be the frequency of the item with the x-th rank. Then,
where a and c are constants. The original Zipf's law states that the frequency of any word in a natural language is inversely proportional to its rank. This relationship applies to natural languages, but also in the physical and social sciences, such as the population ranks of cities, income rankings, and Web page rankings.
Fortunately, we found that the stations in the trajectory data were distributed according to an empirical power law and we present the data fitting results in a later section. According to statistics released by the railway company [14] , the first station is Shinjuku with an average daily number of passengers f (1) = 751, 018, followed by second station, Ikebukuro, with f (2) = 550, 350, the third station, Tokyo, with f (3) = 415, 908 etc. In the extended model, we still assume that passengers choose their destination independently, where they are distributed in f (x), i.e., a destination is likely to be Shinjuku with a rate of f (1) and Ikebukuro at a ratio f (2). We ignore trivial cases where both the source and destination are the same station, but our hypothesis is sufficiently general to be applied to other examples. Before we describe the practical model, we consider the probability distribution of the Zipf model. Suppose that the total number of passengers is denoted by N , which is obtained by evaluating the integral of f (x) from 1 to the number of stations in a specific region, d, as follows;
which allows us to define the probability function of our Zipf model.
Definition 3.3:
In the dataset where the x-th item occurs f (x) times, the probability of the x-th station being selected as the destination is p(
By fitting the open data [14] using the least-squares method, we obtain the constants a = 8 × 10
5 , and c = 0.580, and the probability p(x) = 0.092/x 0.632 .
C. Risk of Records Being Linked
Some records are linkable with pseudonym IDs. If more attribute values are linked, it is more likely that the records will be unique. However, excessively frequent reassignment of pseudonym IDs could degrade the utility of the data. Thus, the length of linked records should be determined carefully based on a tradeoff between security and utility. To determine the least bound of the linked length, we define a threshold probability to ensure that an anonymized dataset is secure against reidentification.
Definition 3.4:
A dataset comprises m records. Let p * be the least unidentifiable probability defined as k/m. A record with a value that occurs with a probability less than p * is uniquely identified in the dataset. The rank of the value is denoted by x * , which is referred to as the least unidentifiable rank.
Where, the least value of k is 2 in terms of k-anonymity. For simplicity, we often presume the least value hereafter whenever specific k is used.
For example, we consider a dataset with 10 records where the attribute values (station) occur with the probabilities given in Table I . Station Nakano has a low frequency because only one passenger stops at the station. Thus, the records containing Nakano must be uniquely identified and they should be suppressed. The least unidentifiable probability p * is 2/10 and the rank of x * is the third. Figure 3 illustrates the least unidentifiable probability p * in a distribution of frequencies in terms of the rank x. The stations are sorted in order from the most frequent to the least based on the number of passengers boarding and alighting. Fig. 3 . Least unidentifiable rank and probability in a long-tailed distribution
The graph shows the fraction of passengers who board and alight at the station ranked at x, i.e., it shows the probability distribution P (x) of x. The number of passengers boarding and alighting at stations is distributed with a "long tail," where a high-frequency population is followed by a low-frequency population that gradually tails off. Long-tail distributions are known to be common in many areas such as the occurrence of certain words in a natural language, the income distribution of a business, or the access counts of Web sites. The most frequent stations are secure in terms of identification because many passengers have records for these stations, which prevents the identification of specific individuals. However, the records with rare stations located in the right-hand shaded area of the figure are likely to be identified and the names of the stations could be used as QIDs to trace their owners. Thus, these records need to be suppressed or generated using k-anonymity algorithms. The least unidentifiable rank x * (and probability p * ) determines the threshold for stations that need to suppressed. It should be noted that a dataset where no records occur with less than the least unidentifiable probability p * satisfies 2-anonymity. In other words, the least unidentifiable probability p * specifies a degree of anonymity such that p * = k/n.
D. Zipf Model of Trajectory Data
We extend our single-station Zipf model to a model with multiple stations. First, we show that the probability function of our model satisfies a type of homomorphism in terms of a join.
Suppose that two records share a common pseudonym ID, but they have distinct stations ranked as x and y. The owner of a pseudonym boards a train at the x-th station and alights at the y-th station.
We assume that the sequence of stations can be regarded as a Markov chain, i.e., given the current station x, the next hop y is independent. Thus, the conditional probability of selecting the y-th station given the current station P (x|y) is equal to P (x). Using the probability function p() in the Zipf model, the probability of a path from the x-th station to the y-th station is given as the joint probability of p(x) and p(y), i.e., model. Therefore, this property allows us to identify the least unidentifiable probability in a trajectory containing several stations as follows.
Theorem 3.2:
A trajectory that comprises s records x 1 , . . . , x s , which are selected according to the Zipf model characterized by f (x i ) = a/x i c , has the least unidentifiable probability
Proof: From Definition 3.4, the least unidentifiable probability is more than k/n = 2/n. Hence, the joint probability of the trajectory of x 1 . . . , x s needs to satisfy a s (x 1 a 2 · · · a x ) −c ≥ 2/n, which gives the theorem.
implies that the corresponding least unidentifiable rank x * increases exponentially relative to the length of the path, s. In order to ensure that the dataset remains unidentifiable, we need to reassign pseudonyms so the records cannot be linked within the limit. Alternatively, the records with minor stations that exceed the least rank can be dropped from the dataset.
An increase in the unidentifiable rank of the trajectory does not mean that a single rank increases as s increases. The rank of a trajectory is a obtained by multiplying the ranks x 1 x 2 · · · x s in the trajectory, so the average rank in the trajectory is the s-th root of the integrated rank x * . For example, when n = 42, 598, 300 (population of Kanto area), the trajectory of s = 3 stations has a least unidentifiable rank of x * = 5, 164 = 17 3 . Thus, the mean rank of x 1 , x 2 and x 3 is the 17-th rank, Tamachi station, which is very common and more than 144,000 passengers stop there each day. By taking the s-th root of Equation 3 , we obtain the mean rank of the trajectory of s-stations as
The mean unidentifiable rank of the trajectory decreases exponentially to s, as shown in Figure 4 . As s becomes longer, the mean rank becomes shorter, and thus the records with minor stations that exceed the threshold increases, i.e., a longer s requires that most of the records are dropped from the dataset. 
E. Quantifying the Utility of Anonymity
The main feature of data anonymization algorithms is that they usually modify the dataset by inserting fake records or suppressing critical records. However, it is well known that we lose more of the useful information if we suppress more records. Therefore, we should design an algorithm carefully based on a tradeoff between the security against risk of identification and the utility of the data. The utility function depends on the analysis applied and it is not easy to define a general formula. Hence, we use the following simple definition to quantify the loss of utility attributable to anonymization.
Definition 3.5:
The anonymity ratio is the fraction of records suppressed to satisfy k-anonymity over all of the records in a dataset.
In the example shown in Table I , the fourth record is suppressed out of m records and the anonymity ratio is 1/10. In general, the anonymity ratio is obtained by evaluating the integral of the probability distribution function from the least unidentifiable rank x * to the maximum rank d. Using the Zipf probability model for a single item, the anonymity ratio is
It is not trivial to extend the result obtained for a single item to the case of a trajectory with s records because there are many possible combinations of x and y such that xy = z for a given threshold. For instance, there are two pairs 3 × 2 = 2 × 3 = 12 for the trajectory of z = 12-th and three pairs for z = 4 because z = 4 = 1 × 4 = 4 × 1 = 2 × 2. Hence, the probability distribution function for the trajectory does not have a closed form even if each element occurs in the Zipf model. Figure 5 shows the probability distribution for the trajectory of s = 2 stations and d = 4, where the squared Zipf probability p(x) is plotted for comparison. Note that these functions are shared at the both ends because there is only one combination at z = 1 and z = d
2 . The probability function of a trajectory is not continuous.
Instead of the closed form probability distribution of the trajectory, we prove the lower bound of the anonymity ratio using our Zipf model.
Theorem 3.3:
The lower bound of the anonymity ratio for the trajectory of s linked records that occur in the Zipf model is a
where x * is the least unidentifiable rank and d is the size of the domain of SA.
Proof: (i) For any x, y, z such that xy
(ii) Suppose that the inequality holds for s as p(
Then, for any x s+1 , the joint probability
s+1 /z c also holds. From (i) and (ii), the inequality holds for any s. Hence, the integral of the probability of p s from the least unidentifiable rank x * to the maximum rank d
gives the lower bound of the anonymity ratio for the dataset of at most s linked records. 2
The exact solution can be obtain within a small s. In addition, we present the closed form of the anonymity ratio for particular s = 2 as follows.
F. Extension of the Zipf Model to Data with Multiple Attributes
In Section III-C, we studied the unidentifiable rank of a single attribute value, e.g., stations; however, we claim that our proposed scheme can also model data with multiple attribute, such as item purchases, amounts of payments, numbers of items, or the time available to use.
We consider attribute 1 and 2 with domains of size d 1 and d 2 , and the probabilities of their values are approximated by the following Zipf models, p 1 (
2 , respectively. Assuming that values occur independently, the joint probability of a record having x 1 and x 2 is given as a new Zipf model. Unfortunately, the closed formula for the exact joint probability is not trivial, but we give the lower bound as follows.
Theorem 3.4:
The attributes have probabilities of p 1 ( respectively. A record has both x 1 and x 2 with a probability P (x 1 , x 2 ) such that
Proof: Given the boundary conditions, i.e., p 12 (
, we have the constants a 12 = a 1 a 2 and d
Note that this corresponds to Theorem 3.3 when m 1 = m 2 , and c 1 = c 2 . In the same manner, we can obtain the Zipf model for the combinations of multiple attributes and identify the least unidentifiable rank to quantity the risk of combined attributes being exploited to identify an individual uniquely.
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. Anonymity of Trajectory Data of the Japan Railway Co. (JR) Stations
JR East tried to sell trajectory data stored on popular RFID prepaid fare cards, Suica, without the consent of passengers in 2013, but they gave up because of excessive criticism. Thus, we studied the risk and utility of the anonymized data that JR East failed to sell.
First, using the least-squared method to fit the number of passengers at stations [14] , we approximated a Zipf model f (x) of the trajectory data as a = 794132 = 8 × 10
5 , c = 0.580, as shown in Figure 6 . According to available open data, we observed similar behavior in the datasets of other railway companies, which demonstrated that ur Zipf model is a good generalization.
Next, using the Zipf model, we examined the least and the mean unidentifiable rank x * for trajectories with s = 1 to 5 in Table II . With a single station (s = 1), there is no records need to be suppressed. However, with s = 2, records with stations that exceeded the 1474-th rank could be uniquely identified and 6.5 % recodes must be suppressed to satisfy 2-anonymity.
The anonymity ratio reached 97.8 % when s = 3, which means that most of the records need to be dropped and the utility of the anonymized data is lost. Finally, we conclude that trajectory data need to be treated so the records cannot be linked to prevent combination becoming uniquely identifiable. The naive application of known anonymization algorithms could degrade the utility of open data because the complexity of the linked records becomes very high as the length of the trajectory increases, and thus many records might be suppressed.
B. Medical DPC Dataset
The DPC dataset, Disease, Procedure and Combination, covers medical records for more than 7 million patients in more than 1000 hospitals [15] .
With the international standard of disease, DPC data contains the followings; the hospital codes, the disease code, sex, age, ZIP code, the duration in hospital, the operation, the height, the weight, the degree of cancers, etc. The DPC dataset is used to study for hospital management and to provide a useful statistics in hospitals. Some of the statistical data is online available and used as open data for many purposes. Fig. 7 shows a sample age distributions in DPC dataset. The lapascope surgery (PCI) has odds ratio of 0.3774, which means that a lapascope surgery makes the probability of death to decrease by 0.3774 times of that who has an off-pump surgery (CABG). We can not find significant difference between two type of surgeries from figure. We can approximate the age distribution in our model, where the most frequent subsets is 70 years-old and the least is less than 40 years-old, which need to be suppressed to prevent the records to be identified.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, to address the issues of anonymization, we proposed a new mathematical model based on the Zipf distribution. We demonstrated that our model is simple, but obtained a good fit with the actual distribution of the JR East trajectory data. We presented the primary property of our model and extended it to a more complex environment. Using our model, we defined the theoretical bound for reidentification, which yields the appropriate optimal level for anonymization. 
